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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Frank Fernandez was convicted under the Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act for his involvement with the Mexican
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Mafia.1 The “Eme” was known as the biggest gang in the Los Angeles area, and
its participants were imprisoned for conspiracy to aid and abet in drug
trafficking within the Los Angeles County jail and for the conspiracies to
murder four individuals.2 Eme’s involvement throughout the prisons allowed
the gang to expand, and this expansion allowed Eme to threaten members of
smaller gangs.3 Eme’s violent actions resulted in crimes that the RICO Act was
specifically designed to prevent. This law, designed to restrict organized crime,
may soon be used to uncover corrupt practices in the United States’ electoral
process.
In 1970, the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was
passed. This statute, under Title 18 of the United States Code, was enacted to
control the infiltration of organized crime within corporate businesses. Its
original function was to prosecute the business practices of criminal cartels.
Modern racketeering law is now applicable to more business practices than just
those run by criminal organizations. Over the past forty years, the Supreme
Court has developed a broad reading of the statute that is widely accepted. The
inclusive nature of racketeering law can now be used to find corruption within
seemingly fair businesses and organizations. Under the recent holding of
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in January 2010, the RICO Act
may even be applied to show corruption in the election process of our own
government. In Citizens United, the Court held that the statute banning
independent corporate expenditures to political campaigns was a ban on First
Amendment speech and was unconstitutional.4
In the aftermath of the Citizens United case, corporate donations to political
campaigns will continue to change drastically. Big corporate spenders will be
able to endorse the candidate with the policies that best serve their business;
these endorsements come in increments of thousands, or maybe even millions of
dollars. Politicians will start constructing campaign platforms to attract the
biggest and wealthiest corporations. Because studies in the past have shown that
wealthier candidates have a better chance of winning elections,5 these donations
might change election outcomes. These changes will take away the validity of
our election process because candidates will be more focused on gaining the
most contributions rather than constructing a platform that gains voter approval.
Section II will explore the general rules of corporate campaign donations
before the holding of Citizens United. This has been a controversial issue in the
* J.D. expected May 2012, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law. I would like to thank all the current members of the Cleveland State Law Review
for their hard work in publishing this issue. A tremendous amount of gratitude is also
owed to my parents, David and MaryAnn Henzler for their constant love, support, and
encouragement.
1

United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1214 (9th Cir. 2004).

2

Id. at 1215.

3

Id. at 1215-16.

4

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010).

5

Brad Alexander, Good Money and Bad Money: Do Funding Sources Affect
Electoral Outcomes, 58 POL. RES. Q., no. 2, 353-58 (2005).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss3/9

2

2011]

POLITICAL GANGSTERS

437

courts that started in the early 1970s with the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971. The Supreme Court had multiple inconsistent holdings on the subject that
led up to the current Citizens United decision.
Section III of this article will summarize the Citizens United case. While
this case had multiple holdings, the Court’s main holding on the categorization
of independent corporate political donations as political speech may completely
alter the election process. In coming to this conclusion, it was necessary for the
Supreme Court to overturn multiple cases, which had previously been used to
set the standard for political donations. While the Court’s reasoning for
unlimited corporate expenditures based upon the First Amendment was
compelling, the ultimate holding still contains flaws.
Section IV will illustrate the immediate effects the Citizens United case had
in the year following its decision. The November 2010 midterm elections were
the first chance that corporations could exercise their new-found expanded First
Amendment rights. The figures show that spending immediately increased. The
further increase of political corporate spending may potentially change the
dynamic of our election system and lead to corruption.
Section V will introduce the RICO Act and the foundation of racketeering
law. A brief history of this law will illustrate how much it has deviated from its
original purpose and how its expanded broad view can be used to cover many
actions other than bad business practices and organized criminal cartels.
Section VI will define the action of racketeering, which is found in Title 18
U.S.C. § 1951. Racketeering can be broken down into two essential elements,
which can be further defined by case law. Previous court holdings can be used
to show what types of specific actions can be considered racketeering. In
exploring how a person in a position of power can affect these elements, the
definitions will foreshadow the possible effects of political candidates having
the ability to obtain large independent corporate expenditures.
Section VII will explain how the act of racketeering fits within the RICO
Act, which is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1962. This act, intentionally written to be
overbroad,6 originated to control the infiltration of organized crime in
businesses. A long list of crimes other than the explicit criminal elements that
make up racketeering under § 1951 can constitute the “racketeering activity”
that is the basis of this statute.
Section VIII will show how racketeering law can be applied to the holding of
the Citizens United case. The application of this law will illustrate the possible
ill effects of the Citizens United rule on our election process that might remove
the integrity from the voting process and take the ultimate power of election
away from the voters.
Section IX will discuss the dissenting opinion of the Citizens United
decision. The four dissenting judges state that the majority’s decision was
misguided and offer other potential arguments the majority could have made
that would not have caused such sweeping changes in the law. This reasoning
can be used by future Supreme Courts if the Citizens United ruling is ever
overturned.

6

Ann K. Wooster, Validity, Construction, and Application of Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 171 A.L.R. FED. 1, 14 (2001).
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Section X will discuss some potential measures that Congress can take in
preventing the corruption created by Citizens United. The only thing that can
completely remove this corruption is a future Supreme Court case overruling
Citizens United. Until then, Congress can create legislation that implements
some regulations and restrictions to protect election integrity.
II. CORPORATE CONTRIBUTION REGULATIONS BEFORE CITIZENS UNITED
Restrictions upon corporate spending in furtherance of political elections
began as early as 1907. The first statute explicitly making corporate donations
illegal was the Tillman Act of 1907.7 It banned “any corporation whatever”
from making “a money contribution in connection with” federal elections.8
There were two main motives behind the Tillman Act: first, to combat “the
enormous power corporations had come to wield in federal elections, with the
accompanying threat of both actual corruption and a public perception of
corruption; and second, [to] respect the interest of shareholders and members in
preventing the use of their money to support candidates they opposed.”9 The
most recent regulations on corporate expenditures were written into the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971. Title 18 § 441b explicitly prohibited
corporations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with any
election to any political office. The text of the statute states that it is “unlawful
for any [. . .] corporation [. . .] to make a contribution or expenditure in
connection with any political office.”10 This section of the Federal Election
Campaign Act was ultimately found to be unconstitutional by the majority in the
Citizens United case.
A. Buckley v. Valeo
The constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act was first
questioned in 1976 in Buckley v. Valeo. 11 The main argument was that the
Federal Election Campaign Act interfered with the First Amendment.12 The
Court stressed that the First Amendment not only protects political speech and
political expression, but also covers the constitutional right of association.13 The
appellee’s main argument was that the Federal Election Campaign Act regulated
the specific conduct of making donations, not the political expression or
association protected by the First Amendment.14

7

FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003). See FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 508-10 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
8
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 509 (citing Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat.
864-65 (1907)).
9

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 953 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

10

2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2010).

11

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

12

Id. at 14.

13

Id. at 15. See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).

14

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
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The appellate court agreed with the appellee’s argument, and based its
reasoning largely upon that of United States v. O’Brien.15 The appellate court in
Buckley distinguished the facts at hand from O’Brien, when it stated that this
was not a case “where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct
arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the
conduct is itself thought to be harmful.”16 The Supreme Court agreed with the
appellate court, by stating that the intent of the Federal Election Campaign Act
was to equalize “the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes by
placing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression by citizens and
groups.”17 The Court further stated that contributions are only one way of
communication; corporations are not wholly prevented from political expression
under the Federal Election Campaign Act because donations in smaller
denominations are allowed, and other forms of communication are still open and
valid.18 The Supreme Court ultimately held that the limits on corporate
contributions by the Federal Election Campaign Act were constitutional, despite
the arguments against these regulations.19
B. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
The court revisited the issue of corporate contributions again in 1978 when
deciding First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 20 In this case, the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited banks and
corporations from making contributions was questioned. The conceptual
questions asked about this state statute were similar to those asked in Buckley,
but here the Court’s decision was in direct opposition with that found in
Buckley.
The Massachusetts statute in question banned corporations from making
contributions “for the purpose of . . . influencing or affecting the vote on any
question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the
property, business or assets of the corporation.”21 This Court again turned to the
question based upon the extension of First Amendment rights to corporations

15
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding the prohibition on burning
a selective service registration certificate constitutional, as such conduct was not
protected political speech under the First Amendment).
16

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382).

17

Id. at 17. The court also held that additional governmental issues include the
prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption, and to open the political system
more widely to candidates with smaller amounts of funding. Id. at 25-26.
18

Id. at 21.

19

Id. at 79.

20

First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).

21
Id. at 767-68 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)). The
Court ultimately broke down the statute into two distinct regulations: the prohibition of
corporate spending to influence ballot questions not materially affecting its business
interests, and a per se illegality standard for corporate spending to influence a question of
individual taxation. Id. at 772.
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making political donations.22 This Court ultimately held that if these speakers
were not corporations, but rather citizens using donations as political expression,
the donations would not be regulable under the First Amendment.23 This
reasoning changes the question from whether corporations have First
Amendment rights, to a question asking if the corporate identity of the speaker
deprives them of these rights.24 This question has been answered in the past, but
the answers have been fact-specific. The Supreme Court has already held that
corporate speech to educate and inform the public25 or to increase the flow of
commercial information26 are both protected under the First Amendment. The
Court stated that, in order to be consistent with these two prior holdings, the
First Amendment should protect corporate speech in the form of political
donations that can be considered political expression, even though the speaker
has a corporate identity.27 The clause in the Massachusetts statute that limits
corporate speech on subjects that “materially affect” the corporation is
inconsistent with the First Amendment rights, as this sort of restriction was
never intended when the First Amendment was created.28
The Court then addressed the “prevention of corruption” reasoning discussed
in Buckley. It did not dispute that this reasoning is important in keeping our
electoral system fair, and that the “preservation of the individual citizen’s
confidence in government is equally important.”29 It ultimately found that
“there ha[d] been no showing that the relative voice of corporations ha[d] been
overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts or
that there ha[d] been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in
government.”30
C. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
The holding from Bellotti on corporate political donations was the precedent
until 1990 when the Court decided Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. 31
Here, a Michigan statute that prohibited corporations from using treasury funds
to make independent expenditures in connection with elections for state office
was challenged.32 The statute in question did not completely prevent
corporations from making political donations—it only required them to make
22

Id. at 771.

23

Id. at 777.

24

Id. at 778.

25

See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).

26

See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 764 (1976).
27

First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978).

28

Id.

29

Id. at 789 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976)).

30

Id. at 766.

31

Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).

32

Id. at 655.
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the donations from a fund separate from their corporate treasury. The Michigan
Chamber of Commerce argued that making donations from a segregated
corporate fund, rather than its treasury fund, “burden[ed] the Chamber’s
exercise of expression.”33 While considering this burden, the Court used a
balancing test, and decided that the need to prevent “corruption or the
appearance of corruption” outweighed the burden caused by having a segregated
fund.34 This case was the active applied precedent until Citizens United was
decided in January 2010.
D. McConnell v. FEC
One last case that is important to consider in the standards before the holding
of Citizens United is McConnell v. FEC. 35 This case specifically addressed the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which amended the Federal Election
Campaign Act. This amendment put further restrictions on contributions to
candidates and money spent on communications that are intended to influence
election outcomes.36
The Court once again considered the arguments originally made in Buckley
and stated the importance of preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption within the election system, and ultimately affirmed that holding.37
More importantly, the Court addressed the definition of a new term introduced
in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: “electioneering communication.”38
The Court held the definition of “electioneering communication” to be
constitutional because it is both “easily understood and objectively
determinable.”39 While it agreed that the statute was a restriction on speech, the
Court stated that the plaintiffs did not make a sufficient argument showing that
this restriction created a significant burden on “First Amendment expression” or
a constitutionality argument based upon over-breadth.40 The Court ultimately
held that the definition of electioneering communication was “wholly consistent
with First Amendment principles as applied to the media.”41

33

Id. at 658. See also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).

34

Austin, 494 U.S. at 659. See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985).
35

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).

36

Id. at 94.

37

Id. at 95.

38

Id. at 102. The definition of this term is especially important in the evolution of
campaign donation restrictions preceding the holding of Citizens United because the
conduct at issue in that case was considered “electioneering communication” under the
statutory definition. “Electioneering communication” is defined as any “broadcast, cable,
or satellite communication” that clearly identifies a candidate for federal office within
sixty days of a general election and thirty days of a primary. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i).
39

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 103.

40

Id. at 105.

41

Id.
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III. CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation that released a movie entitled
Hillary: The Movie in January 2008.42 They wanted to increase distribution by
offering it through video-on-demand via digital cable.43 Citizens United was
prepared to pay $1.2 million to make this movie and three separate
advertisements for it to be available on video-on-demand.44 Afraid that these
actions would violate 2 U.S.C. § 441b (part of the Federal Election Campaign
Act), Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Federal
Election Commission.45 This statute prohibits corporations from making
independent expenditures to elections for political office.46 Subsection (b)(2) of
this statute would specifically bar Citizens United from making the film by
preventing “electioneering communication,” which is defined as “any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate
for Federal office.”47 In its original suit, Citizens United argued that 2 U.S.C. §
441b was unconstitutional as applied to the Hillary movie. The district court
granted the Federal Election Commission’s motion for summary judgment,
holding that § 441b was facially constitutional under McConnell,48 and that it
was constitutional as applied to the Hillary movie because its only interpretation
was that Senator Clinton was unfit for office.49
In addition to the holding in McConnell, Citizens United’s arguments were
also at odds with the holdings of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.50
In that case, the Court held that the application of a state statute similar to 441b
was constitutional.51 The Court here stated that the statute in question prevented
potential corruption by independent corporate donations.52 Between these two
holdings, the federal 441b seemed to be facially constitutional.
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered that the holdings of McConnell
and Austin were binding upon the district court—this gave the district court little
power in deciding the Citizens United case because lower courts do not have the

42

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id. at 888.

46

2 U.S.C. § 441b (2010).

47

§ 441b(b)(2).

48

This court held that the statutory definition of “electioneering communications”
was constitutionally valid. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 105 (2003).
49

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.

50

Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).

51

Id. at 659.

52

Id.
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power to overrule Supreme Court decisions.53 This led the Supreme Court to
reconsider the previous holding of Austin and the facial validity of 441b.54
In considering the facial validity of 441b, the Court stated that “[s]ection
441b makes it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy
corporations—either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates
or broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary
election and 60 days of a general election.”55 Thus, this statute could be read as
an outright ban on corporate political speech.56 The Court further held that
speech by corporations cannot be restricted just because of the speaker’s
corporate identity; it stated that “First Amendment protection extends to
corporations.”57 In essence, the Court held that restricting independent
corporate expenditures is against the First Amendment because it restricts
political expression.
The Court then considered the previous holding in Austin, which held that
restricting independent political donations was constitutional in order to prevent
corruption.58 The main argument the Austin court made was that this political
speech needed to be limited to prevent “antidistortion interest.”59 The Court
intended to prevent “the corrosive and distorting effect of immense aggregations
of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
ideas.”60 This decision left the Court with an inconsistent precedent—the statute
on its face is unconstitutional, but previous decisions state that the application of
these statutes is constitutional. After considering the anti-distortion interest
argument made in Austin, the Court rejected it because “it would permit [the]
Government to ban political speech simply because the speaker is an association
that has taken on the corporate form.”61
Before explicitly overturning Austin, the Court considered the government’s
argument that banning corporate political speech would prevent corruption.62
The holding in Buckley supported this argument.63 The Buckley court limited
corporate donations in state elections in order to prevent improper commitments
from candidates.64 The Court in Citizens United rejected this argument on the
53

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 893.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 897.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 899.

58

Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).

59

See id.

60

Id.

61

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.

62

Id. at 908.

63

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).

64

Id. at 47.
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grounds that twenty-six states do not restrict expenditures for non-profit
corporations, and that “[t]he Government [did] not claim that these expenditures
. . . corrupted the political process in those States."65 Citizens United was also
distinguished from Buckley, because Buckley was dealing with quid pro quo
contributions from corporations.66 The problem of corruption is one that the
Court leaves to Congress to solve; it stated:
If elected officials succumb to improper influences from independent
expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put
expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for concern.
We must give weight to attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either
the appearance or reality of these influences.67
In order to keep up with rapidly changing technology by allowing corporations
to exercise their First Amendment rights in the election process, the Court
explicitly overturned the holding in Austin that banned independent corporate
expenditures to political candidates.68 Thus, the holding of the district court that
stated 441b was constitutional was reversed.69
IV. THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE CITIZENS UNITED DECISION
Changes to the way campaigns are run and financed took place almost
immediately and can be seen through an investigation of the November 2010
midterm elections. It was clear as soon as the decision was final that spending
would change drastically. Michael Toner, a campaign finance lawyer and
former Federal Election Commission chairman stated that “[w]e might be on
track for the most expensive cycles ever, even more than ’08, which is really
hard to believe.”70 It was also clear that not everyone thought the increased
spending would be a good idea. Representative Chris Van Hollen from
Maryland stated “[t]his has got to be a wakeup call to every citizen that they
cannot allow the big corporations to call the shots on these elections.”71 New
York City Public Advocate Bill de Blasio developed an analysis of the political
spending that took place during the election.72 He found that “[s]pending
65

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908-909.

66

Id. at 909.

67

Id. at 911.

68

Id. at 912-13.

69

Id. at 917.

70

Jim Kuhnhenn, Election Spending Sets Records: No Recession Here, HUFFINGTON
POST
(Sept.
7,
2010),
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2010/12/10/anonymous_donors_spent_132
m_on_2010_campaign_ads./.
71

Deborah Tedford, Supreme Court Rips Up Campaign Finance Laws, NPR.ORG,
(Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?Id=122805666.
72
Beth Fouhy, Anonymous Donors Spent $132M on 2010 Campaign Ads,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Dec.
10,
2010),
available
at
http://www.wtop.com/?nid=213&sid=2070829.
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allowed by Citizens United accounted for $85 million in all 2010 Senate
races.”73
Not only have corporations decided to spend more under the new Citizens
United rule, they have started “funneling their money to trade associations such
as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or other groups that can air election ads,
often without having to disclose their donors.”74 Public advocate de Blasio’s
analysis also made startling findings on anonymous donations—as of October
2010, “$80 million [had] already been spent by groups with undisclosed donors
this election cycle—nearly five times more than in 2006.”75 This sort of
spending shields a corporation’s interests—the shareholders and consumers
have no idea what causes their funds are supporting. Craig Holman, a
government lobbyist, stated:
The decision to invest corporate funds in an election is almost always
solely that of the company CEO . . . . In publicly held companies, the
CEO is under no obligation to get the consent of, or even inform,
shareholders of how she or he is spending their money on politics.
This is a new Wild West of unlimited and undisclosed corporate
spending in our elections.76
David Arkush, the director of Public Citizen’s Congress Watch division
observed that “[t]he overwhelming majority of the corporate money flowing into
the 2010 elections remains hidden from public view, laundered through scores
of outside electioneering groups that are refusing to disclose their funding
sources.”77 In an effort to combat corruption, public advocate de Blasio
convinced Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and JPMorgan Chase to keep their
money out of 2010 elections; “[w]ith billions in their general funds, any of them
would have been able to substantially tip the scales of virtually any
congressional or Senate race with the equivalent of pocket change.”78
These harmful effects that began immediately after the Court’s ruling in
Citizens United may worsen in the future and may include potential racketeering
actions by political candidates.

73

Id.

74

Kuhnhenn, supra note 70.

75

Daniel Stone, Coming Clean, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 13, 2010), available at http://www.
newsweek.com/2010/10/13/when-corporate-strategy-meets-election-spending.html
(follow “View As Single Page” hyperlink).
76

Press Release, Public Citizen, Unmasking a Small Slice of Independent Corporate
Spending in the 2010 Federal Elections (Oct. 29, 2010) available at
http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2010/10/29-12. Public Citizen is a non-profit
advocacy organization founded to represent consumer interests in Congress, the courts,
and the executive branch.
77

Id.

78

Stone, supra note 75.
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V. RACKETEERING LAW: A HISTORY
In 1970, Congress passed the Organized Crime Control Act to remedy the
long-standing problem of legislating organized crime.79 Part of this was the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, contained in 18
U.S.C. § 1961, which deals with racketeering activity.80 The most important
element of § 1961 is the requirement of a pattern of activity, as many crimes
other than actual racketeering can constitute a pattern of racketeering under this
statute.81 The elements of the crime of racketeering itself are defined in 18
U.S.C. § 1951. This statute reads:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce
or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or
threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance
of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both.82
In order to constitute racketeering activity, the elements of both § 1951 and §
1961 must be met.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1964 addresses a civil remedy for treble damages under the
RICO Act.83 This clause was overlooked by many after the initial passing of the
RICO Act, but then caused a flood of litigation by unlikely parties in the early
1980s.84 These cases involved private plaintiffs against defendant businesses,
rather than against organized crime rings.85
The RICO act was redefined in 1985 by the holding of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex, Co., Inc.86 The plaintiff here brought a long list of charges against the
defendant, one of which was a RICO claim under § 1964 for civil treble
damages; the plaintiff alleged a pattern of mail fraud.87 The district court barred
this claim for two reasons: first, because the defendant’s actions had not
previously been held in the trial court as mail fraud, and second, the plaintiff
was not alleging any specific “racketeering injury.”88 The Supreme Court
reversed this decision and remanded the case so the RICO claim could be

79
Gregory M. Wasson, “Pattern of Racketeering Activity” Under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 10 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 289 (1990).
80

Id.

81

18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2010).

82

18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2010).

83

18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2010).

84

Wasson, supra note 79.

85

Id.

86

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).

87

Id. at 484.

88

Id. at 481.
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heard.89 The Court held that just because criminal acts were making up the civil
RICO claim does not mean the criminal burden of proof must apply, so there
was no need to have a previous criminal conviction on the alleged charge.90 If
the wire fraud could be proved by a preponderance of evidence standard, the
RICO claim would stand.91 The Court also stated that the plaintiff was not
required to allege any certain type of injury.92 Once the plaintiff alleges each
element of the RICO Act, the injury that follows from the commission of these
acts is the only injury that must be shown.93 This case set a low burden of proof
for a private plaintiff alleging a RICO claim.
The validity and purpose of the RICO act was questioned in 1993 in Reves v.
Ernst & Young.94 Here, the Court stressed the importance of the “liberal
construction” clause. Following 18 U.S.C. § 1961, there is a note that states
“provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes.”95 The Reves court stated that “[t]his clause obviously seeks to ensure
that Congress’ intent is not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of the statute,
but it is not an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that Congress never
intended.”96 The Court held that the statute needs to be read in a flexible way to
ensure that it covers all actions that Congress intended to protect against, but not
more than that.
The holdings of these two cases show how the application of the RICO act
has changed over time to include more types of cases and protect more against
more types of crimes. The expansion of the law allows the elements of RICO to
be defined broadly and applicable to the new plan of unlimited independent
corporate expenditures allowed under the holding of Citizens United.
VI. THE ELEMENTS OF RACKETEERING
Like any criminal statute, the racketeering statute can be broken down to
specific essential elements that must be present to constitute the crime. Two
main elements must be present to form a racketeering action. First, the actor
must obstruct, delay, or affect commerce.97 And second, the actor must do this
through robbery or extortion.98 Some of these elements are explicitly defined
within the statute, but these elements can be further explored through case law.

89

Id. at 500.

90

Id. at 491-93.

91

Id. at 491.

92

Id. at 497. This is lower than the criminal standard for the burden of proof, which
requires charges to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
93

Id. at 496.

94

Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).

95

Id. at 183.

96

Id.

97

18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2010).

98

Id.
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A. The Obstruction, Delay, or Affect on Commerce
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1951 defines the term commerce to mean:
commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory or
Possession of the United states; all commerce between any point in a
State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point
outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State
through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over
which the United States has jurisdiction.99
This definition of commerce set forth in the actual statute is fairly inclusive.
Case law can be used to show the standard that must be met to prove what
constitutes an obstruction, delay, or affect upon this commerce. An obvious
obstruction or effect on commerce would be a restriction upon the sale of goods
or the transport of goods, but the courts in the past have required less action than
that. Most circuits have held that a “de minimus” effect was a proper standard
to constitute a violation,100 but in United States v. Jarabek, the court held that the
government only needed to show a “realistic probability that an extortionate
transaction [would] have some effect on interstate commerce”101. An actual
effect or obstruction of commerce need not be present, the affects just need to be
foreseeable for the actor to have violated § 1951. The court reasoned that “the
requisite interstate commerce nexus could be established if the jury found that,
unless the victim gave in to extortionate demands, the victim’s business might
have been hindered or destroyed.”102 Another court made a finding of affected
commerce based upon the depletion of corporate funds. In United States v.
Gates, the court held that the “extortion of money from an interstate business,
thus depleting its funds” sufficed to show an effect upon interstate commerce.103
The indirect effects of having less money to run the business would have had a
long term effect upon the overall commerce involved in its operation.
B. Extortionate Conduct
For a complete violation of § 1951, there must also be an element of
extortion. The statute defines extortion as “the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”104 The definition included in
the statute explicitly states that there are two separate ways extortion can
happen: first through threatened force, violence or fear, and second under color
of official right.
99
100

18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3) (2010).
United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1999).

101

United States v. Jarabek, 726 F.2d 889, 901 (1st Cir. 1984). See also United States
v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 396 (1st Cir. 1976).
102
Jarabek, 726 F.2d at 901. See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215
(1960).
103

United States v. Gates, 616 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1980). See also United
States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1978).
104

18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2010).
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When analyzing extortion through the first method, one court considered
fear of economic harm. In United States v. Sturman, the court held that “[f]ear
of economic harm is an acceptable form of fear under section 1951.”105 The
term “under color of official right” means those acting in a position of authority,
such as a public office. These two forms of extortion are mutually exclusive—
the government does not have to show force, violence, or fear when proving
extortion through color of official right. The court in United States v. Williams
stated that “to date, eight circuits have directly held that [§ 1951] violations
based on extortion by a public official need not include proof of threat, fear or
duress.”106 This court further stated that the definition of “under color of official
right” is “consonant with the common law definition of extortion, which could
be committed only by a public official taking a fee under color of his office,
with no proof of threat, force or duress required.”107 Another court held that the
mere acceptance of payment could constitute the extortion element under §
1951. In United States v. Butler, the court held that “it is the position of the
United States that such conduct, whether the solicitation of, or the mere
acceptance of, illicit payments for the desired ‘official action’, was a clear abuse
. . . falling within the proscriptions of the Act.”108 Even if the actor is not
soliciting payment, the acceptance of a payment for an act performed within his
official capacity constitutes extortion. Extortion under color of official right can
also be applied even if the actor is not currently holding public office while
engaging in the illegal conduct. The court in United States v. Salvitti held that
“to prove extortion the government need not prove that the defendant actually
possessed the power to carry out his threats; it needs to prove only that the
victims reasonably believed that he had such power.”109 Under this ruling, if the
victim reasonably believes that the actor could gain access to public office, his
actions to gain payment could be considered extortionate. One court also
applied § 1951 to candidates for public office. In United States v. Meyers the
court held that if the candidates enter into a conspiracy to obtain property at a
time before the election, and the conspiracy ends after the actors become public
officials, § 1951 applies.110 This makes “under color of official right” a relative
term that can be applied at any point of the election process that deals with the
selection of a public official. In United States v. Cerilli, the defendants
attempted to combat the § 1951 claim against them by considering the payments
to be political contributions, and therefore valid under the First Amendment.111
105
United States v. Sturman, 49 F.3d 1275, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995). See also United
States v. Warner, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (2003) (applying the fear of economic harm
standard).
106

United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Hathaway,
534 F.2d at 393.
107

Williams, 621 F.2d at 124.

108

United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 417 (6th Cir. 1980).

109

United States v. Salvitti, 464 F. Supp. 611, 616 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See also United
States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 1975).
110

United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 1976).

111

United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 1979).
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The court held that “the coercive solicitation of political contributions is within
the realm of actions that are illegal under [§ 1951].”112
C. Intent
Because both civil and criminal charges can be brought under § 1951, intent
becomes an issue. Some criminal charges require specific intent, while others
have no intent requirement. When considering intent, the court in United States
v. Furey stated that “[§] 1951 is only a general intent statute, not a specific intent
type of statute. A general criminal intent is required, however.”113 The court
further stated that a general intent to obtain property must be present, but a
specific intent to affect commerce is not required.114
VII. RACKETEERING UNDER THE RICO ACT
Just as the elements of racketeering are explicitly defined under Title 18
U.S.C. § 1951, the elements for a pattern of racketeering are stated under Title
18 U.S.C. § 1962, which is the RICO Act. It states:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity .
. . in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. . . .
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of
the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.115

112

Id. at 421.

113

United States v. Furey, 491 F. Supp. 1048, 1061 (E.D. Pa. 1980). See also United
States v. Sweeney, 262 F.2d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 1959).
114

Furey, 491 F. Supp at 1061.

115

18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2010).
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In order to understand how the statutory language of § 1951 fits in under the
language of the RICO Act, § 1961 must be referenced. Section 1961 explicitly
defines some of the key phrases used in the RICO Act. Section 1961 states:
1.

“racketeering activity” means . . . any act which is indictable
under . . . section 1951 (relating to interference with
commerce, robbery, or extortion.) . . .

2.

“person” includes any individual or entity capable of holding
a legal or beneficial interest in property;

3.

“enterprise” includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;

4.

“pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective
date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten
years . . . after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity.116

Essentially, any series of racketeering actions can be used to form “racketeering
activity” under this statute. In plain language, if someone obtains property
through extortion that affects interstate commerce and uses this money to
establish or operate an enterprise, he is acting in violation of section (a).
Multiple racketeering actions that take place within ten years create a “pattern of
racketeering activity.”117
VIII. USING RACKETEERING LAW TO FIND AND PUNISH POLITICAL CORRUPTION
Political corruption is not something that can easily be defined. An act
considered completely corrupt by a voter may fall within the regular course of
business for a public official.118 Corrupt acts can be broken down and
“partitioned into the ‘public official’ involved, the actual ‘favor’ provided by the
public official, the ‘payoff’ gained by the public official, and the ‘donor’ of the
payoff and/or ‘recipient’ of the ‘favor’ act.”119 A study120 has shown that a
situation in which a legislator accepted a large campaign contribution in return
116

18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2010).

117

PAUL BATISTA, CIVIL RICO PRACTICE MANUAL § 2.02 (3d ed. 2011).

118

John G. Peters & Susan Welch, Political Corruption in America: A Search for
Definition and a Theory, or If Political Corruption Is in the Mainstream of American
Politics Why Is it Not in the Mainstream of American Politics Research?, 72 THE AM.
POLITICAL SCI. REV. 974, 974 (1978). See generally POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS
IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., 1978).
119

Peters & Welch, supra note 118, at 976.

120

Id. at 978. This study sent questionnaires to state senators in 24 states. The
questions posed hypothetical situations and asked the senators to judge based on levels of
corruption.
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for voting a certain way on a bill would be considered corrupt by a majority of
people.121 The fact that “the payoff is very direct and immediate”122 leads to a
higher level of corruption, which seems to be generally accepted. It is probable
that “if a campaign contribution were not involved, almost all [of the senators,
rather than just most] would have seen the act as corrupt.”123
Now that racketeering law under the RICO Act has been clarified, it can
effectively be applied to the new donation rules of Citizens United. The major
holding of that case, as previously stated, is that the statute banning independent
corporate expenditures to political campaigns was a ban on speech and was
unconstitutional.124 The possibility of unlimited corporate expenditures may
change the way politicians run their campaigns.
A recent study125 has shown that candidates who gain large pools of money
through donations have a statistically better chance at winning public office.126
There have been findings that state “the higher the percentage of donations a
candidate accepts from PACs [political action committees],127 the more likely
they are to win.”128 Another study states that “it seems that effects are strongest
when more money is spent.”129 This has been viewed as a problem, especially
when corporations are spending independently; this is the exact sort of spending
that the majority opinion of Citizens United endorses. It has been found that
“independent spending is seen as a problem that campaign reformers must
correct. Independent expenditures represent special interests’ uncontrolled
influence over both legislators and elections.”130 These findings are not
shocking—more money can be used to convey more complete information to
the public. It allows for more presence in the media and a more extensive and
active role on the political trail, leading to more voter contact by the candidate.
121

Id. at 979. This action was found to be corrupt by over 90 percent of the sample.

122

Id.

123

Id. The fact that donations were involved seemed to rationalize the activity for
some, making it more acceptable.
124

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010).

125

Alexander, supra note 5, at 354. The specific study referenced is based upon all
open seat House races for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. These were chosen specifically
because sitting Congress members usually have a strong force in deterring high-quality
challengers. Competitive races also tend to encourage larger donations. All of the data
used in this study was acquired online through the Center for Responsive Politics, at
www.opensecrets.org or the Political Moneyline, at www.tray.com.
126

Alexander, supra note 5.

127

See id. Before independent corporate expenditures were unlimited, corporations
formed together to donate through political action committees to support the candidate or
party of their choice. These still currently exist; the donations are now just substantially
larger.
128

Id.

129

Richard N. Engstrom & Christopher Kenny, The Effects of Independent
Expenditures in Senate Elections, 55 POL. RES. Q. 885, 888 (2002).
130

Id. at 899.
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Media coverage and campaign contact with the voters are two of the main
factors that can affect changes in the electoral system.131 Having corporate
money to accomplish these things during a candidate’s campaign will give that
candidate an advantage to control voter turnout. The media can be used to either
positively or negatively charge the political atmosphere of a campaign; “quality
news coverage may mobilize [the voter] while sensationalist tabloid television
may turn off the electorate.”132 Extensive contact with the voting population on
the campaign trail, on the other hand, will usually always have positive effects.
“[W]hen parties and candidates make personal contact with voters, it is assumed
to have a positive influence.”133 A candidate’s access to extra funds to structure
his campaign will allow him to construct attack ads that might demobilize the
opposing parties’ voters, while adding the maximum amount of cities to his
campaign trail to mobilize his own voters. Now that candidates will be able to
obtain all of these things through money from corporations, they may begin
structuring their platforms around issues that are most important to businesses.
The Citizens United case deals directly with media coverage during an
election. The judges of the dissenting opinion believe that corporations will
eventually take over the media coverage of elections. They state:
If individuals in our society had infinite free time to listen to and
contemplate every last bit of speech uttered by anyone, anywhere;
and if broadcast advertisements had no special ability to influence
elections apart from the merits of their arguments (to the extent they
make any); and if legislators always operated with nothing less than
perfect virtue; then I suppose the majority’s premise would be sound.
In the real world, we have seen corporate domination of the airwaves
prior to an election may decrease the average listener’s exposure to
relevant viewpoints, and it may diminish citizens’ willingness and
capacity to participate in the democratic process.134
This language shows that, following the majority’s decision, there was a
legitimate fear that corporate finance toward election media would damage the
election process by affecting the voters’ thoughts, behavior, and likelihood to
vote.
A. Meeting the Racketeering Elements
In the current struggling economy, proposed legislation on corporate tax
cuts, the addition or limitation of restrictions upon factory regulations, or
provisions on employee healthcare can stifle or lengthen the life of a
corporation. If a corporation has a questionable future, and the chances of it
flourishing are dependent upon a candidate’s proposed legislation, the directors
may decide that donations in furtherance of that candidate’s campaign will be in
131

Susan A. Banducci & Jeffrey A. Karp, How Elections Change the Way Citizens
View the Political System: Campaigns, Media Effects and Electoral Outcomes in
Comparative Perspective, 33 BRIT. J. POLITICAL SCI. 443, 448 (2003).
132

Id. at 446.

133

Id. at 447.

134

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 975-76 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the company’s best interest. It is situations like these where we could likely find
potential racketeering actions.
To constitute the specific action of racketeering, the actions will only have to
fulfill § 1951. To constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under the RICO
Act, the actions will have to fulfill both the elements of §§ 1951 and 1962.
Under § 1951, the candidate must affect or delay commerce through
extortion,135 so the target company that he is seeking contributions from must be
involved in interstate commerce. If the candidate is able to obtain funds from a
corporation involved in interstate commerce, then commerce is affected under
the holding of Gates.136 Because the affect on commerce can be judged under a
“de minimus” standard,137 a very minimal action can fulfill this element of the
racketeering statute. Even if no actual affect on the business can be found, the
element can still be fulfilled if the court uses the “realistic probability”
standard138
When analyzing the extortion element, the question of whether the candidate
will be subject to the “under color of official right” standard first needs to be
answered. Under the holding of Meyers, this standard can be applied if the
candidate accepts the money while he or she is a candidate and keeps the money
after taking the position of public office.139 It was also held, in Salvitti, that the
actor must not have actually possessed the power to carry out the actions, but
that the victim reasonably believed he had such power.140 If the candidate is an
incumbent with a strong presence, the parties donating may reasonably believe
that he will hold office for another term. If the “under color of official right”
standard is applicable, no evidence of force, violence or fear is required to prove
extortion.141
If the court decides that the “under color of official right” standard is not
applicable to the candidate, there may be another way to fulfill the extortion
element. Under the holding of Sturman, fear of economic harm is an acceptable
form of fear to sustain extortion.142 If the only reason the corporate directors
donated to the candidate was in furtherance of proposed legislation that would
save their business, then the extortion element can be fulfilled.
The government may still have a case against a candidate if he loses the
election. The court in United States v. Tropiano held that attempted extortion
135

18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2010).

136

United States v. Gates, 616 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the mere
depletion of funds from an interstate business affects interstate commerce, because it
leaves less money for the company to use in furtherance of its business).
137

See United States v. DiCarlantonio, 870 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1989).

138

United States v. Jarabek, 726 F.2d 889, 901 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating that the
government only needs to show that there is a realistic probability that the transaction
could have an effect on interstate commerce).
139

United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 1976).

140

United States v. Salvitti, 464 F. Supp. 611, 616 (E.D. Pa. 1979).

141

United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 1980).

142

United States v. Sturman, 49 F.3d 1275, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995).
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that would affect interstate commerce is enough to violate § 1951.143 Even if the
candidate used his potential power to introduce proposed legislation to gain
contributions and he never took office, his actions can still be held as
racketeering.
In order to sustain a claim under the RICO Act, the candidate has to have
committed two or more racketeering acts within the course of ten years of each
other, and he has to invest the money obtained in the establishment or operation
of his campaign.144 Accepting two or more corporate contributions to be used in
furtherance of his campaign within ten years of each other will constitute a
violation of the RICO Act, then becoming organized crime.145
These actions can create corruption or the appearance of corruption, which
was exactly what the Federal Election Campaign Act was designed to prevent.
The new rule that came from the holding of Citizens United can dismantle the
integrity of our election system, which the government has been taking action to
protect since 1907.
IX. PROTECTING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: THE DISSENTING OPINION OF
CITIZENS UNITED
In order to prevent racketeering activity from becoming a possibility, the
rule from Citizens United that allows corporations to make unlimited
independent expenditures to campaigns must be changed. The dissenting
opinion of this case, written by Justice Stevens, suggests that the majority
created this rule to dissolve irrelevant issues. He also proposes alternative
holdings the majority could have applied that will not have the same ill effects
of the sweeping constitutional change that was actually applied to decide the
case.
A. The Constitutional Arguments
Justice Stevens suggests that the main issue in this case was “whether
Citizens United had a right[ . . . ] to pay for broadcasts during the 30-day period
[before elections].”146 This should not have turned into an argument over First
Amendment speech, because Citizens United was permitted to take part in
electioneering communication under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.147
Not only was the majority’s First Amendment ruling unnecessary, it was also
wrongly decided. The First Amendment protects the free speech of citizens;
“[a]lthough [corporations] make enormous contributions to our society, [they]
are not actually members of it.”148
143

United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1076-77 (2d Cir. 1979).

144

See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2010) (This assumes that a campaign can be considered an
“enterprise” under the definition given in § 1961 because it is said to include “any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”).
145

United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 417 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
acceptance of payment falls within the elements of racketeering).
146

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

147

Id.

148

Id. at 930.
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While the majority opinion stresses the importance of extending the free
speech elements of the First Amendment to corporations, it neglects to analyze
how this will impede upon the speech rights of the shareholders of that
company. “When corporations use general treasury funds to praise or attack a
particular candidate for office, it is the shareholders, as the residual claimants,
who are effectively footing the bill.”149 The shareholders are citizens whom the
First Amendment rights were undoubtedly designed to protect—one class’s
rights should not be hindered to serve the rights of another class. The rule prior
to Citizens United allowed corporations to fund independent expenditures
through segregated funds that would not interfere with the rights of the
shareholders.150 If a shareholder disagrees with the spending of a corporation’s
general treasury fund, the remedies available to them, like derivative litigation,
are long, expensive processes.151 Their only other option is to sell their stock.152
This solution also may not be completely fair to the shareholder; “the injury to
the shareholders’ expressive rights has already occurred; they might have
preferred to keep that corporation’s stock in their portfolio for any number of
economic reasons; and they may incur a capital gains tax or other penalty from
selling their shares, changing their pension plan, or the like.”153
Citizens United’s original claim included a facial constitutional challenge,
but this claim was “expressly abandoned” in its summary judgment motion.154
Citizens United changed its claim to an “as applied” challenge.155 The plaintiffs
never asked the Court to reconsider the holding of Austin, so the majority’s
decision to explicitly overturn the Austin rule and change the standard may have
been completely outside the scope of the case.156 In the dissenting opinion,
Justice Stevens states that “[e]ssentially, five justices were unhappy with the
limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves
an opportunity to change the law.”157
The courts generally disfavor facial challenges.158 The facial challenge that
was applied in Citizens United by the majority was also decided upon pure
speculation.159 The dissenting opinion states that if Citizens United had decided
to raise a facial challenge, “the parties could have developed, through the
normal process of litigation, a record about the actual effects of § 203, its actual

149

Id. at 977.

150

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003).

151

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978.

152

Id.

153

Id.

154

Id. at 931.

155

Id. at 932-33.

156

Id. at 932.

157

Id.

158

Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008).

159

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 933.
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burdens and its actual benefits, on all manner of corporations and unions.”160
Facial challenges made based purely on speculation are obviously not as strong
as those that can be backed up by actual evidence. Claims based on speculation
“raise the risk of premature interpretation of statutes.”161 The dissenting opinion
also states that while electioneering communication is a newer issue brought in
by modern technology, it is not unique enough to require a facial challenge.162
Justice Stevens states that “the fact that a Court can hypothesize situations in
which a statute might, at some point down the line, pose some unforeseen asapplied problems, does not come close to meeting the standard for a facial
challenge.”163 The majority also states that it must use this case to make a facial
challenge, because if they continued to decide as applied challenges “that
process would itself run afoul of the First Amendment.”164 The Court today
cannot be responsible for future judicial error—it cannot decide an issue that is
not presently at hand to protect future decisions.165 The majority’s last argument
for making a facial challenge is that the plaintiffs’ “dismissal of the facial
challenge does not prevent [the court] ‘from making broader pronouncements of
invalidity in properly “as applied” cases.’”166 While the analysis of this portion
of the cited law review article is correct, the majority neglected to state that this
Court used the same law review article for the exact opposite point in a previous
case.167 For all of the above reasons, the majority’s facial challenge that sparked
the extension of First Amendment rights to corporations was unnecessary.
B. Alternative Rulings
Had the majority decided this case upon narrower grounds, which would
have been more appropriate, three alternate holdings could have been
considered. First, the majority could have held that the movie that Citizens
United was attempting to distribute did not qualify as “electioneering
communication,” therefore, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act would not
apply.168 Because the movie was being distributed through a video-on-demand
program, and this type of technology was not main stream at the time the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was written, the Court could have made the
argument that this was not the type of communication the Act was meant to
regulate, and would have had the power to create a new standard for it.169
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Second, the majority could have expanded the rule for non-profit corporations to
cover those that accept only a “de minimis amount of money from for-profit
corporations.”170 Citizens United is a corporation like this and is funded mostly
through donations. Third, the majority could have just decided the case upon
the “as applied” challenge that Citizens United claimed, rather than upon a facial
challenge that they created.171 Justice Stevens states that the majority “could
have easily limited the breadth of its constitutional holding had it declined to
adopt the novel notion that speakers and speech acts must always be treated
identically—and always spared expenditure restrictions—in the political
realm.”172
C. Stare Decisis
The majority opinion is also faulty because it violates the principle of stare
decisis.173 The dissenting judges argue that there was no reason for the Austin
standard to be overturned. A case should only be overturned if the holding was
“dead wrong in its reasoning or irreconcilable with the rest of our doctrine.”174
The majority opinion states that relying on Austin’s ruling would “diminish the
principle of adhering to that precedent.”175 This argument is never further
developed, and the majority opinion never explains why this holding is
inconsistent with stare decisis. In overturning Austin, the Court also never
addressed the holding of McConnell.176 This case used Austin’s rationale—if the
Austin rule was overturned, McConnell should have been overturned
simultaneously.177
One of the main reasons that the majority chose to overrule the Austin
standard was because it created a ban on corporate political speech.178 This is
incorrect—the statute upheld in Austin did “not impose an absolute ban on all
forms of corporate political spending.”179 The statutes at issue in both Austin
and McConnell allow corporations to spend for political purposes from
segregated funds.180 Shareholders also have unlimited spending power if they
act outside the corporate form.181 The only type of corporate speech that was
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limited when Citizens United brought this action must fulfill all of the following
elements:
(1) broadcast, cable, or satellite communications; (2) capable of
reaching at least 50,000 persons in the relevant electorate; (3) made
within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general federal election;
(4) by a labor union or non-MCFL, nonmedia corporation; (5) paid
for with general treasury funds; (6) susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate.182
If the conduct in questions fails to meet even one of these elements, the speech
is protected and cannot be regulated. These regulations on corporate
communication are far from a complete ban on corporate speech.
After overturning the Austin rule, the majority’s next argument is based upon
the corporate identity. It held that “the Government cannot restrict political
speech based on the speaker’s [. . .] identity.”183 This holding by the majority is
inconsistent with many previous cases in which the Court restricted speech
based upon the speaker’s identity.184 In the past, the Court also created rules that
directly regulate political expression.185 These previous holdings make it
reasonable for the Federal Election Campaign Act to regulate corporate speech
without violating the First Amendment.
D. Potential Racketeering
Some of the reasoning in the dissenting opinion uses language that alludes to
the possibility of racketeering in the future. When discussing the importance of
the prevention of corruption, Justice Stevens states, “the difference between
selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree, not kind. And selling
access is not qualitatively different from giving special preference to those who
spent money on one’s behalf.”186 This “special preference” he speaks of can
come in many forms, but any form of reward in exchange for political spending
can escalate into the solicitation of contributions through the extortionate
measures discussed in Sections VI and VII. The dissenting judges also discuss
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the fluid nature of corruption, and how it may manifest in forms other than an
action of plain bribery.187 The Court further states that:
the influx of unlimited corporate money into the electoral realm also
creates new opportunities for the mirror image of quid pro quo deals:
threats, both explicit and implicit. Starting today, corporations with
large war chests to deploy on electioneering may find democratically
elected bodies becoming much more attuned to their interests.188
This is exactly the sort of behavior that would increase the likelihood of
racketeering conduct. The construction of legislation that is motivated by
corporate dollars takes the focus of the government away from the citizens and
turns it into a competition to please the wealthiest companies. Our political
parties will become engaged in a legislative arms race designed to pump out as
much favorable corporate legislation as possible.
The resulting effects on our election system that the dissenting opinion
predicts are consistent with those that would flow from racketeering actions by
candidates. The dissenting judges state that “the opinions of real people may be
marginalized” and “they may lose faith in their capacity, as citizens, to influence
public policy.”189 This language coupled with the possibility of racketeering
conduct indicate that, at the time of the Citizens United decision, the danger of
racketeering was a potential problem that may adversely affect our election
system. By negatively changing the opinion of the voters on the election
system, their active participation in the elections will be chilled, which could
eventually mean less action at the polls than ever before.
X. POTENTIAL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
In order to combat the corruption created by the majority opinion of Citizens
United, Congress can create stronger legislation on corporate spending. Other
than a complete reversal of the Citizens United decision, this is the only thing
that can help maintain electoral integrity. The Center for American Progress
offers multiple congressional solutions to contain the current spending dilemma
created by Citizens United.190
First, Congress can create further legislation to require disclosure statements
on political advertising by corporations.191 Currently, corporations are able to
funnel their spending through other organizations that are not required to
disclose their donors. If Congress creates legislation that will require disclosure,
all corporate spending for elections will become public information. This will
inform shareholders and consumers of where their money is being spent, while
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informing voters of the political views of corporations.192 Requiring disclosure
may affect a corporation’s business; negative affects from the shareholders and
consumers that disagree with a corporation’s view may deter them from making
large expenditures.
Congress can also make an effort to define and regulate coordinated
spending.193 The Citizens United ruling allows independent expenditures, but is
silent on the subject of coordinated spending. Coordinated spending will allow
the candidate to be involved with deciding how the contribution money is
spent.194 Putting further separation between the candidate and the corporation
may directly prevent the potential racketeering conduct, because it will decrease
the amount of pressure a candidate can put on a business by limiting the
interaction between them. Making sure that political candidates and corporate
spenders do not work together in constructing a campaign will reduce overall
corruption.
Corporations can also be further regulated if they have an international
status.195 If a corporation is international rather than domestic, there is a
possibility that foreign money can be used to finance the contributions.196 The
main holding of Citizens United rests upon the idea that First Amendment
political speech rights should be extended to include corporations. While this is
obviously a debatable decision in itself, there is little argument for extending
First Amendment political speech rights to foreign nationals. By restricting
corporations’ spending to only domestic money, the amount a corporation can
possibly donate will decrease, leaving less of a chance of potential future
racketeering actions. If the corporation has less money to draw from, the
candidates may be less inclined to structure a campaign favorable to the
corporation in exchange for endorsement.
Enacting a shareholder protection plan will also decrease the amount of
money a corporation has for donating to candidates.197 If corporations offered
the shareholders (the ultimate owners of the company) a choice between
donating funds to support a specific candidate or party, and receiving a personal
dividend, the shareholders rights will be protected.198 This will also give the
shareholder an option other than completely divesting in the company if he or
she disagrees with the views of the board of the corporation.199 If Congress
enacts a plan like this one, the First Amendment rights of all parties involved
will be protected, and the potential funding for political contributions will be
lower, which will in turn lower the chances of corruption.
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The last, and probably most effective, move Congress can make to reduce
corruption is to pass the Fair Elections Now Act.200 The Fair Elections Now Act
is an act that will give candidates the choice to run their campaign without
accepting any large corporate donations.201 The passing of this act will
completely eliminate the possibility of racketeering conduct. Under this bill,
candidates will fund their own campaigns through small, local contributions.202
Candidates will also receive Fair Elections funding if they are able to collect a
qualifying number of smaller contributions.203 After meeting the qualifying
number of contributions to receive funding, the candidates can continue to
receive small contributions that will be matched by the Fair Elections Fund.204
Candidates that participate in the plan under the Fair Elections Now Act will
also have an advantage by being granted lower campaign costs.205 If this Act is
passed, the candidates who chose to cooperate with its plan will be running in a
fairer and significantly less corrupt election. Choosing to be funded through a
combination of smaller, local contributions and government dollars will mean
that candidates will no longer be dependent upon expenditures from
corporations; their main concern will be constructing a platform that will
positively affect the voters.
XI. CONCLUSION
Racketeering law and election restrictions are two areas of law that are not
typically connected. Previous to the landmark decision in Citizens United, the
chances of finding racketeering within election law were probably very slim.
The corruption created by this new ruling is a fear that the government has
been trying to combat for over a century.206 Not only will the effects of this new
rule increase the appearance of corruption, this corruption may rise to a criminal
level if racketeering action actually takes place. The ever-changing and
expanding definition of racketeering under the Racketeering Influenced and
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Corrupt Organizations Act shows us that including political activity in its list of
offenses is not a far stretch—it is already actively being applied to many
situations that were not intended in its passing. The immediate effects of this
rule have already been seen in the political spending in the November 2010
midterm elections; these sorts of changes will likely take place in the next
presidential election in 2012, but on a larger scale.
This corruption must be remedied. Until there is another situation
controversial enough to reach the Supreme Court level, the decision in Citizens
United cannot be overruled. Until then, it is imperative that Congress take
measures to limit the amount of corruption that takes place in campaigns by
putting as many restrictions as possible on expenditures by corporations. If no
remedial measures are taken to counteract the majority opinion of Citizens
United, the influx of donations and contributions into government elections will
affect voter behavior and may change the outcomes, which will change the
internal structure of the government. These changes by Congress must take
place quickly, as members of Congress are also elected in public bipartisan
elections. After reviewing the amount of changes that took place in the
November 2010 midterm elections, we can see that this corruption trickles to
every level of the government, meaning that if corruption by the new
contribution rules has already reached a congressional level, the chance to
regulate the problem through legislation may be too late.
The duty to regulate this rule can and should be left up to Congress. The
dissenting opinion of Citizens United states a long held belief by the courts: “to
say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard .
. . an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny
to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection.”207 The potential
invasion of organized crime into the election system is only one danger that can
result from the controversial holding in Citizens United. This rule creates an
ultimate need for us to exercise the self-restraint written into the foundation of
our Constitution. Short of a complete reversal of Citizens United, congressional
action is the only thing that can preserve the election system that was intended
to construct the core powers of the United States government.
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